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Abstract 
PAGODA (Probabilistic Autonomous GOal­
Directed Agent) is a model for autonomous 
learning in probabilistic domains [desJ ardins, 
1992) that incorporates innovative techniques 
for using the agent's existing knowledge to 
guide and constrain the learning process and 
for representing, reasoning with, and learn­
ing probabilistic knowledge. This paper de­
scribes the probabilistic representation and 
inf�rence mechanism used in PAGODA. 
PAGODA forms theories about the effects of 
its actions and the world state on the envi­
ronment over time. These theories are rep­
resented as conditional probability distribu­
tions. A restriction is imposed on the struc­
ture of the theories that allows the inference 
mechanism to find a unique predicted dis­
tribution for any action and world state de­
scription. These restricted theories are called 
uniquely predictive theories. The inference 
mechanism, Probability Combination using 
Independence (PCI), uses minimal indepen­
dence assumptions to combine the probabili­
ties in a theory to make probabilistic predic­
tions. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
PAGODA (Probabilistic Autonomous GOal-Directed 
Agent) is a model for autonomous learning in proba­
bilistic domains [desJardins, 1992] that incorporates 
innovative techniques for using the agent's existing 
knowledge to guide and constrain the learning pro­
cess and for representing, reasoning with, and learn­
ing probabilistic knowledge. This paper describes the 
probabilistic representation and inference mechanism 
used in PAGODA. 
PAGODA's beliefs are represented as probabilistic the­
ories about the effects of the agent's actions and the 
current state of the world on the environment over 
time. Each theory consists of a set of conditional 
probability distributions; each of these specifies the 
observed distribution of values of an output feature, 
given the conditioning context. Conditioning contexts 
consist of a perceived world and possibly an action 
taken by the agent. A probabilistic inference mech� 
anism is used to make predictions about the effect 
of the agent's action on the theory's output feature, 
given the agent's perceptions (which may be the cur­
rent perceived world, or a hypothetical perceived world 
generated by the planner). This mechanism requires 
determining which conditional distributions within a 
theory are relevant, and combining them if necessary 
(using minimal independence assumptions) to get a 
single predicted distribution. 
PAGODA has been implemented in the RALPH 
(Rational Agent with Limited Processing Hardware) 
world, a simulated robot world used at UC Berke­
ley as a testbed for designing intelligent autonomous 
agents [Parr et al., 1992]. Examples from this domain 
are used to illustrate the work described in this paper. 
However, the underlying techniques are quite general 
and can be applied to other domains. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:· Section 2 
describes PAGODA's representation for probabilistic 
theories. Section 3 describes the inference mechanism 
used to make probabilistic predictions in planning and 
to determine the likelihood of evidence during learn­
ing [desJardins, 1993]. Section 4 summarizes some re­
lated work on representing probabilistic beliefs, and 
Section 5 presents future work and conclusions. 
2 REPRESENTING 
PROBABILISTIC KNOWLEDGE 
PAGODA's theories are called uniquely predictive the­
ories because a restriction is imposed on the structure 
of the theories that allows the inference mechanism to 
find a unique predicted distribution for any perceived 
world. The next section defines predictive theories. 
Uniquely predictive theories, which are a subset of pre­
dictive theories, are described in Section 2.2. 
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2.1 PREDICTIVE THEORIES 
Definition: The conditional probability 
of X given Y is 
P(XIY) = 
P(X 1\ Y) 
P(Y) 
X, the target or output, and Y, the conditioning 
context, are first-order schemata. These schemata are 
required to be conjunctions of feature specifications, 
where each feature specification may contain internal 
value disjunctions, representing internal nodes in a fea­
ture value hierarchy (for example, vision(t, wall V 
'food, [1, 3]) means that at timet, the agent sees a wall 
or food between 1 and 3 nodes away). In the robot 
domain, each schema corresponds to a set of perceived 
worlds. For example, the following is a valid schema 
in the RALPH world: 
vision(t, any-object, 1) 1\ 
nasty-smell(t, [10, oo]) 1\ Llu(t, -100) 
where any-object represents the disjunction of all 
known objects. llu represents the change in util­
ity during a time step, and is the feature that 
PAGODA initially forms theories to predict. Cross­
feature disjunctions, such as vision(t, food, 2) V 
food-smell(t, 20), are not allowed. Negations of fea­
tures are allowed, since they may be rewritten as dis­
junctions. 
An example of a conditional probability in the RALPH 
domain is 
P(Llu(t + 1, -10)Iaction(t, move-forward)) 
= .75 (1) 
The variable t stands for any time at which this con­
ditional probability is the most specific in the theory; 
that is, the knowledge we have about the situation 
at time t implies this conditioning context and does 
not imply any other more specific conditioning con­
text. Variables are not universally quantified, since 
they cannot be instantiated without examining the 
rest of the theory. The semantics of any individual 
probability within a theory will therefore depend on 
the content of the rest of the theory, as well as on the 
inference mechanism used to instantiate the variables 
and make predictions. 
Intuitively, the meaning of Equation 1 is: given that 
an agent executes the action move-forward at time 
t-and that is all the relevant information the agent 
has-the probability that the agent's change in utility 
at timet+ 1 will be -10 is . 75. The information in the 
conditioning context is assumed to be the only relevant 
information if the agent has no other probability with 
a more specific conditioning context. For example, if 
the agent also knows that vision(t, wall, 1) holds, and 
the theory contains the conditional probability 
P(Llu(t + 1, -10)Iaction(t, move-forward) 
/\vision(t, wall, 1)) = 0 
this more relevant conditional probability will be used 
(and Equation 1 has no bearing on the prediction the 
agent makes). On the other hand, the agent may 
have more knowledge about t-such as the fact that 
nasty-smell was 0-that is not mentioned in any 
probability in the theory; this information is consid­
ered to be irrelevant in the context of the current the­
ory. 
Using conditioning, relevance, and specificity in this 
way yields a quasi-non-monotonic representation: 
adding new knowledge (i.e. , new conditional probabil­
ities) to a theory doesn't change the truth of the rest 
of the probabilities in the theory, but it may change 
their range of applicability, and therefore change their 
semantics. 
Definition: A conditional distribution, 
which we will usually refer to as a rule, is 
a set of n conditional probabilities on a tar­
get schema G (the output feature) , with mu­
tually exclusive partial variable substitutions 
(h . . .  Bn and common conditioning context 
C, such that 
n 
L P(GB;IC) = 1 
i=l 
If C contains all of the relevant information for the 
situation about which predictions are being made, this 
distribution is used to predict the probability of each 
value of G. 
For example, RALPH's utility goes up when it does 
a munch action, but only if there is food in the same 
node. If this has been true on half of the occasions 
it's tried a munch action, it may have a rule predicting 
llu(t1, du) tha.t contains the probabilities 
P(Llu(t + 1, 90)Iaction(t, munch)) = .5 
P(Llu(t + 1, -10)Iaction(t, munch)) = .5 (2) 
A rule with an empty conditioning context is referred 
to as a prior distribution on G, or a default rule 
for G. A prediction on G is the set of probabilistic 
outcomes specified by a conditional distribution. The 
rule in Equation 2 makes the prediction 
{(Llu(t + 1, 90), .5), (Llu(t + 1, - 10), .5)} 
Definition: A predictive theory on out­
put feature G is a set of m conditional dis­
tributions, or rules, on G, with conditioning 
contexts C1 . . .  Cm (which must be distinct 
but not necessarily disjoint), such that any 
situation (consisting of a perceived world and 
possibly an action) implies at least one of the 
conditioning contexts. 
As long as a set of distinct rules on a output feature in­
cludes a default rule it is guaranteed to be a predictive 
theory. 
A predictive theory stores all of the beliefs the agent 
has about the output feature G. The rules in a theory 
are indexed by their conditioning contexts (i.e. , the 
situations in which they apply). Using a specificity 
relation between conditioning contexts, the rules can 
be organized into a DAG in which a child is always 
more specific than its parents. A rule in the theory 
may have multiple parents, but no rule may be an 
ancestor of itself. 
Figure 1 shows an example of a predictive theory on 
a output feature G, drawn as a DAG. Only the con­
ditioning contexts are shown, indicating the structure 
of the theory. A conditional distribution is actually 
stored at each node. For example, the bottom node 
represents a rule containing conditional probabilities 
of the form P(GBiiA(x) 1\ B(x)) =Pi· 
Figure 1: Example of a predictive theory 
2.2 UNIQUELY PREDICTIVE THEORIES 
A predictive theory may correspond to many different 
complete probability distributions. In principle, prob­
abilities that are not specified by the theory may take 
on any value that is consistent with the probabilities 
in the theory. For example, given only the probabil­
ities in Figure 1, P(GID(x)) may take on any value. 
In order to make predictions about situations that are 
not explicitly mentioned as conditioning contexts in a 
rule in the theory, a single distribution must be found 
that specifies the remaining probabilities. 
The Maximum Entropy (ME) principle [Levine and 
Tribus, 1979] provides one method for finding a "best" 
distribution, using the rules in a theory as constraints 
on the distribution. The distribution chosen using this 
method will add the least information possible to the 
existing theory. However, in the general case (i.e., for 
arbitrary constraints), ME is intractable. 
A less expensive approach is to identify reasonable in­
dependence assumptions and use them to find the joint 
distribution. We restrict the set of allowed theories so 
that a unique distribution can be found using only sim­
ple independence assumptions that are consistent with 
the theory. 
If the induction mechanism finds a theory that con­
tains all dependencies that actually exist and no oth-
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ers, it is safe in the limit to assume that any depen· 
dence not represented in the agent's theory does not 
exist. PAGODA's Bayesian learning method will dis­
card any theory that contains additional dependencies 
(irrelevant rules) in favor of a simpler theory without 
the irrelevant rules; similarly, any theory that is miss­
ing dependencies that actually exist (i.e., statistically 
significant correlations in the data) will be discarded 
for one that contains the dependencies. 
PAGODA's inference mechanism is based on this 
independence-assumption approach. The technique 
involves finding a set of most specific rules that ap­
ply to the situation of interest. Shared features in the 
conditioning contexts of these rules are identified; it is 
assumed that the remaining features are independent, 
given the shared features. 
Figure 2: Sample uniquely predictive theory 
The theory shown in Figure 2 specifies the conditional 
distributions corresponding to 
P(Swedish(x)) 
P(Swedish(x)lblond(x )) 
P(Swedish(x)ltall(x) 1\ blond(x)) 
P(Swedish(x)jblond(x) 1\ blue-eyed(x)) 
Recall that the output feature, Swedish(x), does not 
appear in the diagram, but each rule represented 
will make some prediction about the probability of 
Swedish(x), given that the conditioning context holds. 
Now we observe someone who is tall, blond, and blue­
eyed. Given our theory, we wish to find the probability 
that they are Swedish, i. e., 
P(Swedish(x)ltall(x) 1\ blond(x) 1\ blue-eyed(x)) 
If we assume that blue-eyed and tall are indepen­
dent, and that they are conditionally independent 
given blond or blond/\ Swedish, this can be rewritten 
as 
P( Swedish( x) I tall( x) 1\ blond( x)) * 
P(Swedish(x)lblond(x) 1\ blue-eyed(x)) / 
P(Swedish( x) lblond(x)) 
The most specific rules for this prediction are those 
with conditioning contexts tall/\ blond and blond 1\ 
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Figure 3: Unacceptable uniquely predictive theory 
blue-eyed. blond is the shared feature of the con­
ditioning contexts of these rules, and is used to 
separate their effects. The denominator represents 
the combined effects of the two rules; the numer­
ator represents the overlap (essentially the shared 
part of the world state that was included twice). If 
P (Swedish(x)jblond(x)) were removed from the the­
ory, we would assume that it was equal to the prior 
P(Swedish(x)) (which is the most specific rule for 
blond(x)). The complete derivation for the general 
case is given in Section 3. 
However, if we add the distribution specifying 
P(Swedish(x)ltall(x) 1\ blue-eyed(x)) 
yielding the theory shown in Figure 3, we would need 
to assume that blond, blue-eyed, and tall were all 
independent. But if they were, this wouldn't be the 
simplest theory: a perfect induction mechanism would 
have preferred the theory shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Preferred uniquely predictive theory 
The inference mechanism does not work on theories 
such as the one in Figure 3, which have interlinked de­
pendencies such that independent features cannot be 
pulled out individually. In an inductive learning en­
vironment, this is acceptable in principle, since such 
theories will not be generated by an ideal learning 
mechanism. However, in practice, such theories are 
sometimes generated. Therefore, although the formal 
theory does not cover this case, PCI includes heuris­
tics for handling it; these are described in Section 3. 
We now formalize the restriction that excludes theories 
such as the one shown in Figure 3. 
Definition: The most specific rules 
(MSRs) for a situationS are the rules in the 
theory whose conditioning contexts are more 
general than S, such that no more specific 
rule's conditioning context is also more gen­
eral than S. 
A rule is an MSR for a situation S if its condition­
ing context is more general than S and it has no chil­
dren whose conditioning contexts are also more general 
than S. The MSRs for S are the conditional distri­
butions that will be used to make predictions about 
the outcome of the specified action in the world state. 
Uniquely predictive theories, described in the next sec­
tion, are a restricted form of predictive theories that 
allow MSRs to be combined using simple independence 
assumptions; the inference mechanism which does this 
is described in Section 3. 
Definition: A set of rules in a theory is a 
valid set of MSRs if it corresponds to some 
situation; i.e., there must be a sit).lation (per­
ceived world plus an action) that would have 
the set of rules as its MSRs. 
In Figure 1, invalid sets of MSRs include {nil, C( x)} 
(C(x) should be the only MSR) and {A(x),B(x)} (since 
A(x) 1\ B(x) would be a valid MSR for the situation). 
Definition: The shared features of a set 
of rules are the features that appear in all 
of the conditioning contexts and have some 
value in common. 
"Shared features" may also refer to this shared set 
of values for the features, in which case they may 
be thought of as the minimum specializations of the 
common features. For example, the shared feature of 
blond(x) 1\ blue-eyed(x) and tall(x) 1\ blue-eyed(x) 
is blue-eyed(x). The shared features of 
and 
are 
vision(10, food, 2) 1\ food-smel1(10, 5) 
1\ nasty-smell(10, 10) 1\ L\.u(10, -10) 
vision(t, food, [1, 3]) 1\ action(t, move-forward) 
1\ food-smell(t, 20) 
vision(t, food, 2) 1\ action(t, move-forward) 
The action appears in the shared features because the 
first situation implicitly allows any value for the action, 
so the shared value is move-forward. 
Definition: A set of rules is separable if 
there is some rule in the set (which is also 
referred to as separable with respect to the 
rest of the set) whose conditioning context 
can be split into two parts: one group of fea­
tures that is shared with a single other rule 
in the set, and one group of features that is 
shared with no other rule in the set. Either 
group of features may be empty. 
The restriction on uniquely predictive theories is sim­
ply that every valid set of MSRs must be separable. 
Figure 3 violates this restriction because the valid set 
of MSRs 
{tall(x) 1\ blond(x), blond(x) 1\ blue-eyed(x), 
blue-eyed(x) 1\ tall(x)} 
is not separable: all of the rules in the set share fea­
tures with both of the other rules. 
3 PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE 
This section describes Probability Combination using 
Independence (PCI), the inference method that is ap­
plied to a theory T to compute the distribution ofT's 
output feature G, given a situation S. Given a set of 
MSRs for S, PCI iteratively finds a separable rule in 
the set, computes its contribution to the overall prob­
ability using independence assumptions, and recurses 
using the remaining rules as the new set of MSRs to 
explain the remaining features. The algorithm oper­
ates as follows: 
1. Let R be the set of the n most specific rules 
(MSRs) in T that apply to S. This set consists 
of all rules, r;, whose conditioning context C; is 
satisfied by the situation, where no strictly more 
specific rule also satisfies the situation: 
R={r;: [ S-+C; ]/\ 
-,:Jrk, k =j; i: [(S--+ Ck) A (Ck --+ C; )]} 
2. The rules are ordered so that each rule r; is sep­
arable given the set of rules 1'i+1, . . . , rn. Recall 
that r; is separable with respect to a set of rules 
if its conditioning context can be split into two 
parts: !;', a group of features (possibly empty) 
that is shared with some rule in the set, and fi, 
the remaining features, which are shared with no 
other rule in the set (i.e., are unique to r in this 
set of rules). This is guaranteed to be possible if 
T is a uniquely predictive theory, since each set 
of rules 1'i . . . rn is a valid set of MSRs. 
3. The probability of G() is computed, for each () 
common to all rules in the set of MSRs (i.e., for 
values of G that are assigned non-zero probability 
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by every rule in the set). If we assume that fl' is 
independent of the features only found in the rest 
of the rules (i.e., of uk>i ck - Jt), and also con­
ditionally independent of those features given G 
and f! (yielding a total of 2( n 
-
1) independence 
assumptions, all consistent with the dependencies 
explicitly expressed in the theory), this probabil­
ity is equal to 
P( GO I S) = il�-1 P( GBIC;) (3) 
ilj,:-11 P(GBifJ) 
(The derivation of this equation is given below.) 
If n is 1, the product in the denominator is defined 
to be 1, the predicted distribution on an output 
feature when only one rule applies is simply the 
distribution given by that rule. 
4. The probabilities in the denominator of Equa­
tion 3 are computed by applying PCI recursively. 
The resulting probabilities are derived probabilities, 
which may be used to make further inferences in the 
planning process, but otherwise are not reused. Specif­
ically, they are not stored in the theory. This keeps the 
empirical probabilities represented in the theory dis­
tinct from the inferred, subjective probabilities (they 
are subjective because the independence assumptions 
have not been directly validated against the data). 
The formula given in Equation 3 is derived as follows. 
Consider the effects of pulling out the first MSR, r1, 
and assuming that its unique features ff' are indepen­
dent of the remaining features (Ui>1 Cj - jl), and 
independent of these features given G and J[. In or­
der to simplify the derivation somewhat, we assume 
that r2 is the rule that shares the feature if. This is 
not necessarily the case: in fact, r2 is simply the next 
separable rule. However, making this assumption does 
not affect the validity of the derivation. We will refer 
to the features in r2 that are not shared with r1 as !2. 
Then using only Bayes' rule1 gives us the derivation in 
Figure 5. Iterating on the last term in the numerator 
yields Equation 3. 
If the inductive learning algorithm is "perfect" -i.e., it 
identifies all dependencies that exist-this procedure 
will be guaranteed to work, because the independence 
assumptions will be correct. However, in practice, the­
ories are often not perfect, due to limited data or an 
inadequate search heuristic. The result is that the pro­
cedure may not yield a valid distribution on G: the 
computed probabilities may sum to less than or more 
than one. In this case, we normalize the probabili­
ties to sum to 1 and proceed as usual. In the extreme 
case, the sum of the probabilities will be zero if every 
1This is a slightly non-standard version of Bayes' rule. 
The general form of the rule we use here is: 
P(XIY 1\ K) = P(XIK)P(YIX 
1\ K) 
P(YIK) 
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P(GIS) P(Giff 1\ ft 1\ f2 1\ C3 ... Cn) 
P(Gift) P(ff 1\ f� 1\ C3 ... CniG 1\ ft) 
P(ff 1\ f2 1\ c3 ... Cn Iff) 
P( Gift) P(ff IG 1\ ft) P(f� 1\ c3···Cn IG 1\ ft) 
P(ff Iff) P(ff 1\ c3···Cn!ft) 
P(G!f') P(f;'IJ:) P(GINA/t) P(f:I AC, ... Cnllt) P(GIJ; AC, ... CnA/t) 1 . P(GIJ;) P(Gift) 
P(ff 1ft) P(f2 1\ C3 ... Cn iff) 
P(Giff 1\ ft) P(Gift 1\ f� 1\ C3 ... Cn) 
P(Gift) 
P(GIC1) P(GIC2···Cn) 
P(Gift) 
Figure 5: Derivation of Combined Probability 
value of the output feature is assigned zero probabil­
ity by some MSR. In this case, PCI assumes that not 
enough data has been collected to cover the current 
case adequately, and uses the less specific probability 
P(Gif:), where f! is the set of features that are shared 
by all MSRs (possibly empty, in which case the prior 
probability P( G) is used). 
3.1 AN EXAMPLE OF PCI 
Figure 6: Theory to be used for making predictions 
Taking the theory represented in Figure 6 as a predic­
tive theory on a Boolean feature G, and leaving out 
the argument a:, the theory can be rewritten as a set 
of conditional probabilities: The theory in Figure 6 
represents the probabilities p9, Pa, Pab, Pae, and Ped. 
Rg: Pg = P(G) 
Ra: Pa = P(GIA) 
Rab: Pab = P(GIA 1\ B) 
Rae: Pae = P(GIA/\ C) 
Red: Ped = P(GIC 1\ D) 
In order to find any probability which is not explicitly 
represented in the theory, PCI must be applied. The 
simplest case is when only one rule applies to the new 
probability. For example, for the situation A 1\ D, R 
(the set of most specific rules) is just { Ra}, so 
P( GIA 1\ D) = P( GIA) = Pg 
For the situation A 1\ B 1\ C 1\ D, R is {Rab, Rae, Red}­
Rae is not separable given Rab and Red, since it shares 
the feature A with Rab and C with Red· Rab is sepa­
rable given Rae and Red, since it only shares features 
with Rae, and Rae is separable given Red, so a valid 
ordering is R = (Rab, Rae, Red)- Applying Equation 3 
gives 
P(GIA 1\ B 1\ C 1\ D)= 
P(GIAAB) P�GIAAC) P(GICAD) 
P(G A)P(GIC) 
P(GIC) must be computed recursively: in this case, R 
is {R9}, so P(GIC) = P(G) and 
P(G!A 1\ B 1\ C 1\ D)= 
P(GIAAB) P(GIAAC) P(GICAD) 
P(GIA)P(G) 
4 RELATED WORK 
In order to use probabilistic knowledge in an auto­
mated learning system, a formal system for represent­
ing and reasoning with probabilities is required. In 
particular, given a set of generalized conditional prob­
abilities (i.e., a probabilistic theory) and some (possi­
bly probabilistic) knowledge about a particular object, 
the system must be able to make probabilistic predic­
tions about unobserved properties of the object. 
Kyburg [1974] defined the reference class for a proposi­
tion as the features that are relevant for making prob­
abilistic predictions about the proposition. For ex­
ample, the appropriate reference class for determining 
whether or not Chilly Willy can fly in the previous ex­
ample is the class of penguins. The reference class for a 
proposition will depend on what is being predicted and 
on what probabilities are represented in the theory or 
set of beliefs. Once the reference class is found, deter­
mining the probability of the proposition may require 
probabilistic inference from the beliefs in the theory. 
Bacchus's [1990] probabilistic logic and Pearl's [1988b] 
belief nets provide formalisms for representing proba­
bilistic knowledge. We discuss these two approaches 
in the following sections. 
4.1 LOGIC AND PROBABILITY 
Bacchus's [1 99 0] probabilistic logic is a formal lan­
guage for representing probabilistic knowledge using 
first-order logic. The language provides a representa­
tion for both statistical probabilities (defined in terms 
of observed frequencies of events) and subjective prob­
abilities (degrees of belief derived from the statistical 
probabilities). The inference mechanism provides for 
some manipulation of the statistical probabilities using 
standard axioms of probability, and for direct infer­
ence from statistical to subjective probabilities using 
the narrowest reference class. 
The subjective probability of a proposition is given a 
formal interpretation as the total probability mass of 
all possible worlds in which the proposition is true. An 
example (given by Bacchus) of a subjective probability 
in the language is "birds fly with probability at least 
0.75," written as 
Vx.prob(bird(x)) > 0--+ prob(fly(x)lbird(x)) > 0.75 
The antecedent is necessary because Bacchus does not 
permit conditioning on a statement which is known to 
be false. Qualitative relationships between probabil­
ities can also be expressed; for example, conditional 
independence can be explicitly written as 
prob(A 1\ BIG) = prob(AIC) prob(BIC) 
Statistical probabilities, representing frequencies of 
events in actual trials, have a different syntax, and 
require "placeholder variables" to indicate which vari­
ables are intended to vary randomly. For example, the 
statement "ten tosses of a coin will land heads 5 times 
with greater than 95% probability" is written as 
[freq-heads(x) = .5!10-tosses(x)]x > 0.95 (4) 
Direct inference from statistical to subjective prob­
abilities is based on finding a statistical probabil­
ity with the same reference class as the desired sub­
jective probability. If no such probability is avail­
able, a simple type of independence is assumed non­
monotonically, and the "next narrowest" reference 
class for which a probability is available is used. For 
example, if one wishes to find the probability that 
a particular sequence of 1 0  tosses of a quarter will 
yield five heads, and the only statistical probability 
available is Equation 4, the direct inference mecha­
nism non-monotonically assumes independence offreq­
heads and quarter, given 1 0-tosses, yielding 
prob(freq-heads(T) jlO-tosses(T) 1\ quarter(T)) 
[freq-heads(x) = .5j1 0-tosses(x) 1\ quarter(x)]x 
[freq-heads(x) = .5j1 0-tosses(x)]x 
> 0. 95 
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While Bacchus's language provides a useful formalism 
for representing many aspects of probabilistic reason­
ing, including certain forms of default reasoning, it 
does not provide a representation for beliefs about rel­
evance, nor does it allow default assumptions such as 
independence or maximum entropy to be used in the 
inference process. 
4.2 BELIEF NETWORKS 
A belief network is a compact representation of a com­
plete joint probability distribution on a set of propo­
sitions. Each proposition is represented as a node, 
and conditional probabilities (dependencies) are rep­
resented as links between nodes. Any nodes that are 
not directly connected are assumed to be conditionally 
independent, given the intervening nodes. 
A probability matrix is stored at each node in the net­
work, representing the conditional probability distri­
bution for that node given its set of parent nodes. The 
joint probability distribution P(x1, . .. , Xn) for the n 
nodes in a belief network is the product of the condi­
tional probabilities of all nodes given their parents. 
One problem with belief nets as presented above 
is that they require a probability matrix of size 
k; njEparents, kj at every node i (where k; is the 
number of values that the random variable at node 
i takes). Pearl [1988a] gives several models for com­
puting this matrix from a subset of the probabilities; 
he refers to these models as Canonical Models of Mul­
ticausal Interaction (CMMis). The noisy-OR model 
of disjunctive interaction models a set of independent 
causes (parents) of an event (node). Each cause has 
an associated "exception"- a random variable which, 
if true, will inhibit the effect of the cause on the event. 
For example, Pearl gives a situation where the event in 
question is a burglar alarm going off; the two causes are 
a burglar and an earthquake; and the two inhibitors 
are that the burglar is highly competent and that the 
earthquake has low vertical acceleration. Given an 
event E with Boolean causes C; and associated ex­
ceptions with probabilities q;, the overall probability 
of the event is given as: 
P(Eic1, .. . , Cn) = II 
i:c;isTRUE 
This model allows the probability matrix to be com­
puted from only n probabilities, instead of the 2n that 
would be required to enumerate all of the conditional 
probabilities in the complete matrix. 
PAGODA's uniquely predictive theories are a hybrid 
of rule-based approaches and the belief-net method 
of representing dependencies. They consist of rules, 
which are easy to manipulate, perform inference with, 
and learn using familiar and intuitive inference rules 
and inductive operators. However, the rules are not 
modular: the semantics does not allow the inference 
rules to be applied to a theory without knowing what 
other rules exist in the system. 
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PCI provides the equivalent of a sophisticated CMMI 
for a node in a belief network. The probabilities stored 
in PAGODA's theories are used to compute the entries 
that would appear in the probability matrix dynami­
cally, assuming independence where necessary. There­
fore, PCI could be used within a belief net framework 
to reduce the number of probabilities that must be 
precomputed and stored at each node. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
We have described uniquely predictive theories and 
PCI, a representation and inference mechanism for 
predictive probabilistic theories. PAGODA, a model 
for autonomous learning [desJardins, 1992] , uses PCI 
for representing learned theories, for evaluating poten­
tial theories, and for making probabilistic predictions 
for planning. The implementation of PAGODA in the 
RALPH world, a simulated robot domain, has shown 
uniquely predictive theories and PCI to be a useful 
and powerful mechanism for representing probabilistic 
predictive theories. 
The constraints on theories allow certain kinds of inde­
pendence to be captured automatically, but it may be 
desirable to allow more complex interactions. One way 
to do this would be to identify more common types of 
interactions and provide general solutions for comput­
ing the effects of those interactions (as we have already 
done for independence). 
Another open area for research is using the results 
of the inference process to guide future learning by 
identifying weaknesses with the existing theory. For 
example, the cases described in Section 3 (when the 
distribution yielded by PCI is invalid, requiring nor­
malization or the use of a less specific probability) in­
dicate that something is wrong with the learned theo­
ries: either an important dependence is not captured, 
or the probabilities are wrong. Representing the' con­
fidence PAGODA has in its theories (e.g., by main­
taining second-order probabilities on the rules) would 
provide useful information for the system to determine 
whether a problem actually exists and, if so, where it 
lies. 
Uniquely predictive theories and PCI provide a pow­
erful new mechanism for representing and reasoning 
with probabilistic information, complementing previ­
ous work in the areas of probabilistic logics and belief 
networks. 
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